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The role of repression in the incidence of ironic errors was investigated on a golf 
task. Coping styles of novice golfers were determined using measures of cogni-
tive anxiety and physiological arousal. Following baseline putts, participants (n 
= 58) performed a competition putt with the opportunity to win UK£50 (approx. 
US$100). Before completing the competition putt participants were instructed 
to “land the ball on the target, but be particularly careful not to over-shoot the 
target.” The distance the ball traveled past the hole formed the measure of ironic 
effects. Probing of the coping style × condition interaction, F(2, 41) = 6.53, p < 
.005, revealed that only the repressors incurred a significant increase in ironic 
error for the competition putt. This suggests that the act of repressing anxiety has 
a detrimental performance effect.
When attempting to describe or explain the anxiety-performance relationship in 
sport, researchers typically refer to the conscious processing hypothesis (Masters, 
1992), processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), and cusp catastrophe 
models (Hardy, 1996), and these theoretical positions continue to attract research 
attention (e.g., Hardy, Beattie, & Woodman 2007; Mullen, Hardy, & Oldham 2007; 
Wilson, Smith, & Holmes, 2007). Conversely, the theory of ironic processes of 
mental control (Wegner, 1989, 1994) has received minimal research attention despite 
its potential applicability to sport (Janelle, 1999; Woodman & Hardy, 2001).
Developed from earlier work by Chevreul (1833), Freud (1915/1957) and 
Baudouin (1921), Wegner’s (1989, 1994) theory of ironic processes of mental 
control holds that one dual-control system can result in both intentional and 
counter-intentional effects. Similar to other dual-functioning control systems of 
self-regulation (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1990), Wegner’s theory comprises two pro-
cesses that work together in attempts to maintain control: These are the operating 
process and the monitoring process. The intentional operating process searches 
for mental contents consistent with the desired state or goal; the operating process 
is consciously guided and effortful. Conversely, the monitoring process searches 
for signals of failure to achieve the desired state; the monitoring process is usually 
unconscious, autonomous, and less demanding of mental effort (Wegner, 1994, 
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1997). As the monitoring process identifies lapses in control, it keeps the mind 
sensitive to the conditions that indicate intentional control is failing. In this sense, 
it is adaptive; it ensures that the individual enjoys mental control. When mental 
load (e.g., anxiety, information-processing demands) increases, the operating pro-
cess enjoys less cognitive space, and it is superseded by the monitoring process. 
This is what makes the monitoring process ironic: By keeping the mind sensitive 
to potential failure of the system, the monitoring process is also responsible for 
failure of the system.
Ironic effects have been illustrated in a number of studies (e.g., Ansfield, 
Wegner, & Bowser, 1996; Wegner, Ansfield, & Pilloff, 1998; Wegner, Broome, 
& Blumberg, 1997). Findings have consistently revealed that participants under 
mental load do the very thing that they are trying not to do (e.g., being happy when 
specifically trying not to be happy). Despite the impressive body of research in sup-
port of ironic effects (e.g., Wegner et al., 1998; Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993; 
Wegner, Shortt, Blake, & Page, 1990), much of this research has been conducted 
using laboratory-based cognitive load paradigms (e.g., holding a six-digit number 
in working memory), which are of limited ecological validity in sport. One aim of 
the current research is to test the theory using a more ecologically valid stressor.
Wegner (1989, 1994) suggested that cognitive load (i.e., information-processing 
demands), internal and external distractions, emotional processing, and physiologi-
cal arousal will all likely increase the probability of ironic errors. When one consid-
ers the demands of sport in this context, athletes appear to be ideal candidates for 
the study of ironic errors. As stated previously, however, there is only very limited 
research on ironic errors in the sport research literature. One exception is Dugdale 
and Eklund’s (2002) study of attention to umpires, which revealed some support 
for Wegner’s theory in that participants reported more awareness of the umpire 
when explicitly instructed not to do so. Contrary to Wegner’s (1994) proposal, 
this effect was not moderated by cognitive load. An earlier experiment by Wegner 
et al. (1998) revealed somewhat stronger support for the theory in a performance 
context. In this study, novice golfers were required “not to hit the ball past the 
glow spot [the target]” under mental load and under no mental load. Wegner et al. 
reported that participants overshot the ball significantly more when under mental 
load. That is, they performed in precisely the counterintentional manner when their 
working memory was being taxed. From an ironic process theory perspective, the 
increased cognitive load leads to the increased accessibility of unwanted movement 
thoughts (“do not hit past the target”), which in turn leads to an increased tendency 
toward such unwanted movement (i.e., to hit past the target); the monitoring of the 
unwanted movement thought ironically becomes the most accessible movement 
thought, which in turn leads to the unwanted movement. This position was sup-
ported in the Wegner et al. (1998) experiment (see also Beilock, Afremow, Rabe, 
& Carr, 2001).
In the current research, we aim to extend Wegner’s theory to potential modera-
tors of ironic performance effects. One obvious moderator is that of anxiety coping 
style, which has also received minimal attention in the sport psychology literature. 
According to Weinberger, Schwartz, and Davidson (1979), the truly low anxious 
person reports low anxiety and the physiological symptoms of anxiety suggest 
that the person is indeed low in anxiety. By contrast, although they also report low 
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anxiety, repressors have elevated behavioral and physiological anxiety responses 
(Newton & Contrada, 1992; Weinberger et al., 1979; Weinstein, Averill, Opton, 
& Lazarus, 1968), which suggests they deny their anxiety. In this manner, there 
is a discrepancy between repressors’ cognitive representation of anxiety and the 
associated behavioral and physiological symptoms (Gudjonsson, 1981).
The denial of anxiety associated with repression likely contributes to the limited 
amount of performance variance that has been accounted for by anxiety self-report 
measures (cf. Craft, Magyar, Becker, & Feltz, 2003; Woodman & Hardy, 2003). 
For example, Williams and Krane (1992) found that the Competitive State Anxiety 
Inventory-2 (Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, & Smith, 1990) subscales collectively 
predicted 5.9% of performance variance when all participants’ scores were included 
in the analysis and 14% when repressors’ scores were excluded from the analyses 
(see also Jerome & Williams, 2000). This is not surprising because the repressor 
reports low anxiety despite being anxious.
Although studies suggest that truly multidimensional measures of anxiety 
will likely help elucidate the anxiety-performance relationship (cf. McKay, Selig, 
Carlson, & Morris, 1997; Mullen, Hardy, & Tattersall, 2005; Wilson et al., 2007), 
much research on repression has also relied on self-report measures alone. That is, 
following Weinberger et al.’s (1979) influential paper, repression is conceptualized 
as those who report a combination of low trait anxiety and high social desirability. 
This is because repressors are thought to be high in defensiveness; they defend 
their ideal image of the nonanxious person. Although this stance has some validity 
(cf. Weinberger, 1990; Weinberger et al., 1979), relying on self-report measures 
precludes the investigation of the essence of repression; that is, the discordance 
between cognitive reports and behavioral and physiological indices of anxiety. As 
Weinberger et al. (1979) state, repressors “typically deny having elevated levels 
of anxiety, even though they often respond nonverbally (italics added) as if they 
were highly anxious” (p. 369). A second aim of the current investigation is to 
conceptualize repressors in a truly multidimensional framework, whereby their 
response to an anxiety-provoking situation can be measured both cognitively and 
physiologically.
As Weinberger and colleagues (1979) state, “repressors’ defensiveness and 
preoccupation with avoiding awareness of anxiety may often interfere with effec-
tive coping and, paradoxically, promote behavioral and physiological responses 
indicative of high anxiety” (p. 370). Thus, ironically, attempts to minimize the 
effects of anxiety might promote the very behavioral and physiological indices of 
anxiety that the repressor is trying to mask. In other words, the repressor is in fact 
under more mental load than an individual who is anxious and simply expresses this 
anxiety. In the context of ironic process theory, the repressor is under more cognitive 
load than a truly (nonrepressive) low or high anxious person. As such, one would 
expect repressive individuals to suffer more from ironic errors than individuals who 
are either low anxious or truly high anxious. Specifically, given that (1) cognitive 
load has been demonstrated to lead to ironic performance errors (e.g., Wegner et 
al., 1998) and (2) repressors experience the cognitive load of anxiety as well as 
the cognitive load of repressing the expression of that anxiety (Calvo & Eysenck, 
2000; Weinberger et al., 1979), we hypothesize that the magnitude of the ironic 
error will be greater for repressors than for other participants.
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Method
Participants
Sixty-nine right-handed undergraduate sport and exercise science students (38 
men, 31 women; M
age = 21.1 yrs; SD = 4.77) agreed to take part in the study. All 
participants provided written informed consent and background information regard-
ing age, sex, and golf experience before commencing the study. Participants had 
no long-term golfing experience (48 had never played golf; 12 had played once or 
twice on pitch and putt; four had played once or twice on a driving range; five had 
played one or two rounds of golf).
Measures
Cognitive Anxiety. The Mental Readiness Form-3 (Krane, 1994) was used as 
the self-report measure of anxiety. The MRF-3 was developed as a less intrusive 
alternative to the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2, Martens et al., 
1990). It comprises three items that are each scored on an 11-point Likert scale: 
cognitive anxiety from 1 (worried) to 11 (not worried), somatic anxiety from 1 
(tense) to 11 (not tense), and self-confidence from 1 (confident) to 11 (not confident). 
Each item correlates significantly with the associated CSAI-2 subscales: cognitive 
anxiety (.58), somatic anxiety (.59), and self-confidence (.77). As well as being 
less intrusive than the CSAI-2, the MRF-3 was preferred for its use of the word 
“worried.” Indeed, the CSAI-2 uses the more ambiguous term “concern,” whereas 
the essence of repression is the portrayal of the self as specifically not worried.
Physiological Arousal. Heart rate (HR) was measured with the use of a Pulse 
Tronic-Blitz heart rate monitor to provide an indication of participants’ physiological 
responses to anxiety. Participants wore the elastic chest strap (with the transmitter) 
against the skin and the experimenter wore the receiver watch. This was to avoid 
potential interference with the task. Participants’ HR was recorded while they 
completed the MRF-3 on two occasions: (1) before completing the baseline putts 
and (2) before the experimental putt. HR has been used in numerous studies as an 
indication of participants’ physiological response to anxiety (Janelle, Singer, & 
Williams, 1999; Rainville, Bechara, Naqvi, & Damasio, 2006; Tremayne & Barry, 
1990) and monetary incentive (Fowles, Fisher, & Tranel, 1982; Wright, Killebrew, 
& Pimpalapure, 2002).
Performance. We measured performance using a golf task on a flat Astroturf 
surface. Two white spots, 2 m apart, were painted on the surface indicating the 
spot where the ball was to be putt from and the target. The target was 11 cm in 
diameter, equivalent to the diameter of a regulation golf hole. Regulation golf balls 
and a standard right-handed golf putter were used throughout. Finally, we used a 
standard tape measure to record the distance that the ball was either underputted 
or overputted.
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Procedure
Each participant completed the study individually in a laboratory. After participants 
had read and completed the informed consent form, the second author fitted the 
heart rate monitor. To obtain a true resting HR, we asked participants to sit quietly 
for at least 5 min and until heart rate reached asymptote before commencing the 
experimental protocol. Participants also provided background information including 
age, sex, and golf experience during this time.
We informed the participants: “The aim of the task is to putt the golf ball onto 
the target spot. Following each putt the experimenter is going to measure how far 
the ball is either under-putt or over-putt.” After receiving the task instructions, 
participants completed the first MRF-3 (“Please indicate how you feel about per-
forming the next 15 practice putts”) and we recorded their HR.
After participants had completed the 15 baseline putts, we told them: “You have 
one final putt. This putt provides you with the opportunity to win fifty pounds sterling 
[£50; approximately US$100]. If you land the ball entirely or in part on the target, 
we will give you £50.” Participants then completed the second MRF-3 (“Knowing 
that the next putt could win you £50 (FIFTY POUNDS), please indicate how you 
feel about performing the next putt”) and we recorded their HR. As participants 
prepared for their final putt, we instructed them: “Try to land the ball on the target, 
but be particularly careful not to hit the ball past the target. Do not overshoot the 
target.” Participants then completed the final putt and the experimenter recorded 
where the ball landed. The final putt served as the test condition.
After the final putt we answered questions, debriefed participants, and thanked 
them for their time. We took further contact details for payment of participants who 
were successful at winning the £50.
Results / Classification of Coping Styles
We used cognitive anxiety (from the MRF-3) change scores and HR change scores 
to operationalize participants’ coping styles. Specifically, we calculated the differ-
ence between participants’ cognitive anxiety at Time 1 (baseline putts) and Time 
2 (experimental putt) and between participants’ HR at Time 1 and Time 2. For 
example, a participant whose MRF-3 cognitive anxiety score was 7 at Time 1 and 5 
at Time 2 would receive a cognitive anxiety change score of 2; a participant whose 
HR was 65 at Time 1 and 71 at Time 2 would receive a change score of 6.
Median splits were carried out on the change scores of cognitive anxiety (M
change 
= 1.22, SD = 2.60, Median = 1.00) and HR (M
change = 6.01, SD = 11.28, Median 
= 6.00). In subsequent analyses, participants with a change score greater than 1 
for cognitive anxiety and greater than 6 for HR were classified as high anxious. 
Participants with change scores less than 1 for cognitive anxiety and less than 6 
for HR were classified as low anxious. Participants with a change score greater 
than 1 for cognitive anxiety and less than 6 for HR were classified as defensive. 
Finally, those participants with change scores less than 1 for cognitive anxiety and 
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greater than 6 for HR were classified as repressors. One outlier was identified and 
removed from all analyses. Final group sizes were as follows: 19 high anxious, 14 
low anxious, 11 repressors, and 14 defensive participants. As we had formulated no 
hypotheses for the defensive group, these participants were removed from further 
analysis. It is worth noting here that the operationalization of these coping styles 
is based on participants’ state anxiety and physiological arousal rather than on trait 
scores. We used such state scores to ensure that the measurement of participants’ 
strategy for coping with anxiety (e.g., repression) was taken as close as possible 
to the measurement of performance.
Anxiety Manipulation
To ensure that the participants’ cognitive anxiety change scores and HR change 
scores truly reflected the groups to which we had assigned them, we conducted 
a series of Bonferroni-corrected t tests (alpha = .008). These confirmed that: for 
the high anxious group, both cognitive anxiety, t(18) = 10.65, p < .001, and HR, 
t(18) = 6.28, p < .001, significantly increased from Time 1 to Time 2; for the low 
anxious group, neither cognitive anxiety, t(13) = 2.69, ns, nor HR, t(13) = .16, ns, 
significantly changed between Time 1 and Time 2; for the repressor group, cogni-
tive anxiety did not significantly increase, t(10) = 1.57, ns, and HR significantly 
increased, t(10) = 6.72, p < .001.
The somatic anxiety and self-confidence change scores also reflected the groups 
to which individuals had been assigned. That is, there were no significant changes 
in somatic anxiety or self-confidence for the low anxious or repressor groups. Only 
the high anxious group significantly increased in somatic anxiety, t(18) = 6.11, p 
< .001, and significantly decreased in self-confidence, t(18) = 5.41, p < .001, from 
Time 1 (baseline) to Time 2 (Test).
The groups’ descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.
Main Analyses
Participants’ first five putts served as familiarization and were not used in the 
analyses. The next ten putts provided the baseline measure (Time 1) and were 
used to compare with the performance in the experimental test condition (Time 2). 
A 3 (coping style: high anxiety; low anxiety; repressor) × 2 (condition: baseline 
putts; experimental putt) ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor was 
conducted on participants’ performance scores. The ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect for coping style, F(2, 41) = 3.40, p < .05, η2 = .14; a significant main 
effect for condition, F(1, 41) = 7.09, p < .05, η2 = .15; and a significant coping 
style × condition interaction, F(2, 41) = 6.53, p < .005, η2 = .24. The mean overputt 
scores for each group are presented in Table 1.
Three dependent-means t tests were performed to follow up the significant 
interaction. These t tests revealed no significant performance differences across 
conditions for either the high anxious participants, t(18) = −1.86, ns, or the low 
anxious participants, t(13) = 2.11, ns. The repressors, however, overputted the ball 
significantly more during the test condition than during the baseline condition, 
t(10) = 2.54, p < .05, η2 = .39.
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One participant won £50 by successfully landing the ball on the target during 
the £50 experimental condition and was rewarded accordingly; this participant 
displayed a defensive coping style.
Discussion
The results of this study lend support to Wegner’s (1994, 1997) notion that cogni-
tive load increases the likelihood of ironic errors; participants suffered significantly 
more from ironic performance errors in the high-anxiety experimental condition. 
This also corroborates the results of Wegner et al. (1998). However, the primary 
purpose of this study was to examine the moderating role of anxiety coping styles 
in the incidence of ironic errors. More specifically, we hypothesized that repres-
sors would be particularly vulnerable to ironic errors, as their cognitive strategy 
to inhibit the subjective distress related to anxiety increases their cognitive load 
and thus makes them more prone to ironic errors. The current results support this 
notion, because repressors were the only group to suffer significantly from ironic 
performance errors.
This study is exploratory and warrants further research. First, it is important 
to establish the degree to which repressors engage in effortful attempts to mask 
their anxiety. In other words, do repressors deceive themselves or do they only 
deceive others? This is important, as one of the central foundations of Wegner’s 
(1994) ironic process theory is that the operating process requires cognitive space. 
As such, cognitively effortful repression will compete with the operating process 
for cognitive resources. In other words, if repression is effortful and preempts 
cognitive resources then it is worthy of exploration in the context of ironic effects. 
Conversely, if the act of repression is beyond consciousness, then it will likely not 
compete with the operating process for cognitive space and should not disturb the 
operating process. The current results tend to support the former explanation rather 
than the latter, because the repressors were the ones to suffer from ironic effects. 
Although research on the relative effortful or effortless nature of repression is 
mixed, the act of repression demands purposeful attention away from anxiety (cf. 
Bonanno, Davis, Singer, & Schwartz, 1991; Derakshan & Eysenck, 1997a; Fox, 
1993), and it is likely that such active avoidance demands at least some cogni-
tive resources. That is, the repressor likely engages in elements of both self- and 
other-deception (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2005), and the cognitive load associated 
with such deception makes the repressor a potentially fruitful candidate for future 
research on ironic effects.
It is tempting to suggest that one should operationalize repression on the basis 
of the discrepancy between self-report somatic anxiety and physiological indices 
of anxiety rather than on the basis of discrepancies between cognitive anxiety 
and physiological activity. In other words, one could argue that the repressor 
misreads his or her physiological arousal or is simply unaware of such activity. 
This is especially true given that the somatic anxiety scores for both low anxious 
and repressor groups did not significantly change from baseline to test, which 
suggests that somatic anxiety might be well suited for operationalizing repression. 
However, such a view would be misguided for a number of reasons, in particular 
repressors’ tendency to interpret anxiety-related physiological symptoms as 
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reflective of excitement and challenge rather than of distress and anxiety (Derakshan 
& Eysenck, 1997b; Eysenck, 1997). For example, Weinberger et al. (1979) found 
that repressors reported less cognitive anxiety than somatic anxiety, whereas there 
was no such discrepancy for low and high anxious persons. The discrepancy for 
repressors is likely because the somatic symptom can be more easily interpreted 
in a positive light (e.g., increased heart rate can be interpreted as excitement) than 
the cognitive symptom (e.g., “I am worried”) even if the physiological symptom 
is worry-induced (see also Derakshan & Eysenck, 1997b). Interestingly, no such 
interpretation differences were revealed in a recent study by Jones, Smith, and 
Holmes (2004). In Weinberger et al. (1979), cognitive anxiety better discriminated 
between coping styles (low anxious, high anxious, repressors) than somatic anxiety. 
Specifically, low anxious participants reported less cognitive anxiety than high 
anxious participants and more cognitive anxiety than repressors. In contrast, somatic 
anxiety did not differentiate between the repressor and low anxious groups. In light 
of these considerations, we believe it important to define repressors on the basis 
of their cognitive anxiety scores rather than their somatic anxiety scores. Further, 
we believe that repressors should be operationalized in a manner that is as close 
as possible to the definition of repression; in other words, low self-report cognitive 
anxiety and high physiological indices of anxiety. Cognitive anxiety is preferred 
to somatic anxiety for one final reason in the context of the current study. That is, 
the cognitive anxiety term of the MRF-3 is “worried,” which has the advantage 
of capturing precisely the emotion that the repressor is attempting to mask. The 
somatic anxiety term “tense” is rather more ambiguous in this sense and thus further 
removed from repression.
Given that repressors form 10–20% of the general population (Myers, 2000) it 
is likely that the heavy reliance on self-report measures of anxiety (e.g., the CSAI-2) 
has somewhat limited our understanding of the anxiety-performance relationship. 
Ironically, although repression provides an ideal forum for understanding the likely 
complex interplay between physiological indices of anxiety and the self-report of 
such anxiety, the majority of research into repression has been based on self-report 
measures only. That is, the repressor is typically operationalized as an individual 
who scores low for anxiety (e.g., on the State Trait Anxiety Inventory; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch & Lushene, 1970) and high for defensiveness (e.g., on the Marlow-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale; Crowne & Marlow, 1960). However, this operational 
definition of repression fails to capture the repressor who does not report high social 
desirability. In other words, the repressor who reports low anxiety and average or 
low levels of social desirability would not be classified as a repressor according 
to this definition. Physiological measures of anxiety allow one to more accurately 
define such individuals as repressors (Barger, Kircher, & Croyle, 1997; Newton & 
Contrada, 1992). A series of recent experiments that investigated the nature of the 
deception in repression revealed conflicting characteristics of defensiveness, where 
repressors display attempts to deceive both self and others (Derakshan & Eysenck, 
2005). This highlights a limitation of Weinberger’s (1990) purely cognitive approach 
to the investigation of the repressive coping style. Moreover, a number of research-
ers have called into question the validity of the Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability 
Scale in the operational definition of repression, as it was not constructed to be 
used as a measure of repressive coping (Jorgensen & Zachariae, 2006; Schimmack 
& Hartmann, 1997; Tomaka, Blascovich & Kelsey, 1992).
192  Woodman and Davis
One of the strengths of this study was the identification of repressors through 
multidimensional measures assessing both cognitive anxiety and physiological 
arousal; this method more accurately reflects the original definition of repression by 
highlighting the discrepancy between reported cognitive anxiety and the associated 
physiological arousal. Despite this advance, future research might benefit from more 
sensitive measures of heart rate (e.g., heart rate variability or beat-to-beat intervals; 
Mullen et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2007). Furthermore, biochemical responses to 
anxiety such as salivary alpha amylase or cortisol concentration (McKay et al., 1997) 
or skin conductance response rate (Coifman, Bonanno, Ray, & Gross, 2007) might 
offer more refined insight into the role of physiological arousal in repression. This is 
particularly true in sport where anxiety-induced heart rate is not easily differentiated 
from exercise- or effort-induced heart rate (Woodman & Hardy, 2001).
Novice golfers comprised the participants for this study. Consequently, the 
application of the present findings to elite performers is likely limited. Further, 
Wegner et al. (1998) reported that the effect of cognitive load on ironic errors was 
“somewhat more pronounced for novices than for golfers, but not significantly 
so” (p. 197). In fact, although they are glaringly obvious when they happen (cf. 
Woodman & Hardy, 2001), truly ironic errors in elite sport are likely rare events. 
Most expert performers likely perform very much more frequently in the manner 
they intended than in the manner they specifically sought to avoid. In the context 
of ironic process theory, this suggests that the operating and monitoring processes 
most often work together in harmony in the maintenance of mental control for 
elite performers. Experts exhibit perceptual and cognitive advantages over novices 
with greater pattern recognition and available attentional resources for advance cue 
utilization (Janelle, 1999; Williams, Ward, & Smeeton, 2004). Thus, a considerable 
amount of cognitive load is likely required to overwhelm the operating process 
and induce an ironic error, which is likely not easily replicated under laboratory 
conditions.
Although exploratory, the current study offers some potential implications for 
practitioners. First, as repressors suffered from ironic performance effects under 
stress and high anxious individuals did not suffer such effects, strategies that 
encourage disclosure for repressors would likely be beneficial (see also Strean & 
Strean, 1998). Such strategies would involve the athlete’s acceptance of his or her 
feelings and the subsequent willingness to share such feelings. This would likely 
involve some considerable in-depth long-term work with some self-report and 
physiological index of anxiety. In other words, it would be no trivial task. Further, 
as the degree to which the repressor’s deception is self-oriented or other-oriented 
remains unclear (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2005), advocating long-term consultancy 
to address the other-deception is premature at this stage.
Perhaps a more parsimonious implication from the current results (see also 
Wegner et al., 1998) relates to the nature of coach instruction. Indeed, when under 
stress, receiving an instruction not to act in a particular fashion can result in the 
individual performing that very action. As previously mentioned, this appears more 
pronounced for the novice. Thus, when providing instructions for a relatively novel 
task, the coach would do well to focus on verbalizing positive instructions rather 
than simply verbalizing the to-be-avoided action. Such instruction would likely 
help the performer initiate positive non-ironic instructions under stress. This seems 
particularly worthwhile for the repressor performer.
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There are some limitations to the current research that are worth mentioning 
here with a view to addressing them in future. First, the median split technique is 
rather crude for allocating individuals to a particular group. Although the subsequent 
pre- to posttest analyses confirmed that the groups were meaningfully classified 
based upon their change scores (e.g., low anxious = no significant change in cogni-
tive anxiety with no significant change in HR; repressors = no significant change in 
cognitive anxiety with a significant increase in HR), a more refined manner would 
be to categorize individuals on the basis of more extreme scores such as quartile 
splits (e.g., Derakshan & Eysenck, 1998). Such an approach would ensure more 
clearly distinct group classification, although it would clearly require participants 
in greater numbers that were evident in the current study. Second, the nature of the 
stressor was such that it allowed participants only one attempt at the prize (£50). 
We chose such a stressor to increase the ecological validity of the task. That is, the 
nature of sport is such that the performer often has one attempt only (e.g., soccer 
penalty shoot out) where the difference between failure and success on that attempt 
is the difference between elimination and qualification, losing and winning. This 
considerable gain in ecological validity comes with a considerable cost in reliability 
and this is further evidenced in the large performance standard deviations under 
stress. Despite this cost in reliability the effects are in the hypothesized direction 
with only repressors suffering from ironic performance effects. A challenge for 
future researchers, however, is to create conditions that are ripe for irony while 
maintaining experimental control.
In summary, the current study provides some initial support for Wegner’s 
(1989, 1994) theory of ironic processes of mental control in the context of sport 
performance. Moreover, the interaction between coping style and stress condition 
suggests that repression should be considered as a potentially influential coping 
style in the incidence of ironic errors. The additional cognitive load that repressors 
experience when denying their anxiety appears to have been the critical amount 
required to overwhelm their resources and incur ironic errors. The operational 
definition of repression and other coping styles requires greater clarity and con-
sistency to ensure future research is accurate in its attempts to investigate the 
underlying mechanisms of the anxiety-performance relationship. To this end, the 
use of multidimensional measurements of anxiety will likely help provide more 
insight into these mechanisms.
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